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Yet Defendants' entire argument is that any diminuation in value 
of Plaintiffs' property is due to "functional obsolesence"--
problems in the way the buildings were constructed. Defendants' 
argument focuses only on the buildings and fails to consider the 
highest and best use of the property. In State by and through 
Road Commission v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1975), this 
Court stated: "The land owner should get the reasonable value of 
his land if put to the highest and best use." This is true even 
if the current use being made of the property is something less 
than the highest and best use. State Road Commission v. Jacobs, 
16 Utah 2d 167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964). The highest and best use of 
Plaintiffs' property prior to the taking was commercial. Both 
the Plaintiffs' expert (T. 158) and the Defendants' witness (T. 
277) so testified. Plaintiffs' expert testified that the value 
of the land as commercial property was $3.30 per square foot for 
a total value prior to the taking of $225,684.00 (T. 184). This 
value was in no way tied to the existing structures on the 
property, but was simply based on the highest and best use of the 
land as commercial property. Conceding that the existing 
structures, although functional for Plaintiffs' purposes, are not 
ideal as commercial structures, does not change the value of the 
land as commercial property. Nor does assigning no value to the 
buildings, due to depreciation or "functional obsolescence" 
affect the damages proven by Plaintiffs at trial. 
-?-
The change in value of the land as a consequence of the 
taking is due to the change in the highest and best use to which 
the property can be put. That diminution in value must be 
calculated based on the highest and best use of the property 
prior to the taking (commercial property valued at $3.30-$3.00 
per square footMT. 184, 278) minus the highest and best use of 
the property after the taking. 
The highest and best use of the property after the taking 
was not commercial. Plaintiffs1 expert testified that the 
property was suited only for "light industrial" use (T-159), with 
a value of $1.30 per square foot. Defendants1 expert testified 
that "commercial use requires some kind of parking, generally out 
in front or alongside.... commercial use does not generally exist 
with parking solely in the rear." (T-282). As a direct conse-
quence of the taking, all of Plaintiffs' store-front parking was 
eliminated. Plaintiffs were left with property having no store-
front parking and no commercial access. Without access or 
adequate parking, the highest and best use that could be made of 
the property is light industrial or "something less than commer-
cial." (T-159). 
Therefore, the only proper method to calculate severance 
damages given these facts is that used by Plaintiffs1 expert 
i.e., the value before, as commercial property, minus the value 
after, as light industrial property, or "something less than 
commercial." Giving Defendants the full value of their argument 
-3-
of "functional obsolescence11 does not cure the defects in the 
jury's verdict since their argument deals only with the devalua-
tion of the building and not the land on which it sits. Any 
calculation that does not take into account the change in the 
highest and best use ignores the evidence presented at trial is 
contrary to long-standing legal precedent and fails to afford 
Plaintiffs their full measure of damages. 
B. The Change in Access Impacted the Value of the 
Property. 
Defendants1 evidence is contradictory. In essence, however, 
the Defendants argue that there was no change in the access to 
Plaintiffs1 property. Defendants do not deny the erection of a 
wall and chainlink fence across all but 20 feet of the property. 
Nevertheless, Defendants contend that such neither adversely 
impacted the access to the property nor its value. 
The bottom line is that the highest and best use of the 
property changed because reasonable access was denied and 
store-front parking was eliminated. Even Defendants1 witness 
testified that the access allowed, one 20-foot opening in the 
retaining wall and fence, was "not reasonable." (T. 234) No 
satisfactory explanation was offered by Defendants as to why no 
attempt was made to provide reasonable commercial access. 
Plaintiffs were not allowed to present to the jury their 
evidence of what access was allowed other commercial property 
located nearby on Redwood Road with similar frontage. 
Plaintiffs1 proffered testimony and photographs to show that 
nearby properties were allowed access over sixty percent of their 
total frontage. (T. 338) Defendants1 objection to this testimony 
was sustained. (T. 340) Plaintiffs' expert testified that if 
the State's construction project had been designed with two 
40-foot openings and no retaining wall or fence, the property 
could have retained its store-front parking. (T. 96) If 
Plaintiffs had been provided reasonable commercial access, and 
the construction had been planned to allow adequate parking, 
Defendants may have had some ground to argue that the taking did 
not change either the access allowed or the commercial value of 
the property. However, the facts simply do not support that 
argument since Plaintiffs' access was reduced from 192 feet to 20 
feet and their store-front parking was completely eliminated. 
Defendants' argument that there was no change in access, and thus 
no change in value, simply cannot be supported on the facts of 
this case. 
C. The Severance Damages Awarded were Improper. 
Defendants, at page 12 of their Brief, attempt to distin-
guish the landscaping costs from their testimony of "cost to 
cure" by stating: "The testimony offered regarding landscaping 
had nothing to do with curing the parking problem, but was 
offered as a direct alternative to increasing [sic] the value of 
the unusable parking strip to something useful." _Id. Defendants 
both at trial and on appeal characterize the landscaping as an 
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attempt to increase the value of the remaining property (T-294, 
Defendants1 Brief P. 12). The cost to landscape the property is 
not a relevant factor in calculating severance damages. 
Landscaping costs were not offered as the difference in the value 
of the property before and after the taking and that argument 
must fail. Defendants1 direct testimony at trial was that there 
was no difference in value before or after the taking. (T-280) 
Defendants1 argument at trial was that the landscaping was simply 
a way to increase the value of the remaining property, not that 
the landscaping costs represented severance damages. 
At Page 14 of their Brief, Defendants attempt to justify the 
award given by stating "Plaintiffs were put in as good a finan-
cial position as they were before the taking in terms of the 
property they owned and were entitled to use.11 (Emphasis added). 
The attempt: to qualify this statement is telling and underscores 
the weakness in Defendants1 argument. 
Defendants1 argument is based on two false premises: First, 
that Plaintiffs1 damages are limited because their buildings are 
old and somehow not fully functional for commercial purposes; 
thus the qualification "in terms of the property they owned" and 
second, that Plaintiffs were somehow not entitled to the access 
the property had prior to the taking, giving rise to the 
qualification "and were entitled to use." Defendants fail to 
show why Plaintiffs would be unable to recover depreciation in 
value attributed to "functional obsolescence." Defendants1 
functional obsolescence argument fails to make allowance for the 
highest and best use that can be made of the property and the 
change that occurred in that highest and best use. Defendants1 
second premise, that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any 
consideration for the change in access is not supported by the 
facts, and flies in the face of statutory provisions such as Utah 
Code Annotated § 27-12-134, and case law such as Utah State Road 
Commission v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974). 
Defendant cannot reconcile the conflicting positions that 
there is "no difference11 in the value of the property before and 
after the taking, and that the value of landscaping the former 
parking lot somehow represents the difference in the value of the 
property before and after the taking. The landscaping costs were 
prospective expenditures which are not proper elements of damage. 
See Board of Trustees v. B.J. Service, Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406 
P.2d 171 (1965). The cost to improve the appearance of the 
property by landscaping constituted only a partial "cost to cure" 
and does not represent severance damages. 
The award of severance damages in the instant case is not 
supported by the evidence and the Plaintiffs are not in as good a 
financial position as they occupied prior to the taking. As 
such, Plaintiffs have been denied their entitlement to just 
compensation as required by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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CONCLUSION 
The proper calculation of severance damages, based on the 
evidence presented at trial, would have to include the change in 
the highest and best use of the property and the change in access 
caused by the taking. Neither of these factors were considered 
in the award given. Plaintiffs therefore request that this case 
be remanded so that severance damages may be properly calculated 
based on the evidence presented at trial and as by law provided. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1988. 
CLARK W. SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
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